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How	COVID-19	health	diplomacy	could	help	countries
in	South	Asia	reengage	with	SAARC
As	the	coronavirus	spreads	across	South	Asia,	the	South	Asian	Association	for	Regional	Cooperation	(SAARC)
held	its	first	virtual	summit	to	begin	coordinating	the	region’s	response	to	the	crisis.	Here	Andre	Sanches	Siqueira
Campos	(KU	Leuven,	Belgium)	explains	how	diplomacy	in	public	health	across	the	region	could	provide	a
mechanism	for	countries	in	South	Asia	to	reengage	with	the	structures	and	mission	of	the	regional	organisation.
On	March	14,	Prime	Minister	of	India,	Narendra	Modi	tweeted,	“I	would	like	to	propose	that	the	leadership	of
SAARC	nations	chalk	out	a	strong	strategy	to	fight	the	coronavirus.	We	could	discuss,	via	video	conferencing,	ways
to	keep	our	citizens	healthy.	Together,	we	can	set	an	example	to	the	world,	and	contribute	to	a	healthier	planet”.
Member	states	of	SAARC	responded	promptly	to	the	tweet	and	the	first	Virtual	Summit	of	Leaders	of	the	South
Asian	Association	for	Regional	Cooperation	(SAARC)	was	held	on	March	15,	a	significant	exercise	for	health
diplomacy	in	the	region,	which	also	draws	attention	to	the	growing	role	of	“twiplomacy”.
Considering	SAARC’s	inactivity	in	recent	years	at	high-level	meetings,	after	the	tensions	between	India	and
Pakistan	increased	in	2016	due	to	the	terrorist	attack	on	Uri	by	a	group	based	in	Pakistan,	New	Delhi’s	foreign
policy	seems	to	be	committed	to	reviving	regional	engagement	around	SAARC.	With	the	exception	of	Pakistan,
who	sent	a	Special	Assistant,	all	governments	were	represented	at	the	head	of	state	or	at	a	government	level,
together	with	the	institution’s	Secretary-General	and	Sri	Lankan	diplomat,	Esala	Weerakoon,	to	share	experiences
and	discuss	scenarios	and	prospects	for	collective	action.
COVID-19	emergency	measures:	from	rhetoric	to	action
India	mobilised	the	countries	presented	at	the	meeting	to	launch	a	COVID-19	Emergency	Fund,	bringing	the	total
financial	contributions	to	a	modest	US$18	million,	whose	system	is	operationalised	with	the	approval	of	a
consensus	among	members	that	contributed,	but	has	India	as	its	main	donor	and	manager.	From	a	narrative
perspective	analysis,	SAARC	leaders	are	willing	to	engage	in	regional	cooperation	in	order	to	manage	the
coronavirus	outbreak,	a	pandemic	that	does	not	respect	borders.	From	a	financial	point	of	view,	perhaps,	the	$10
million	deposited	into	the	fund	by	India	(Bangladesh	contributed	US$1.5	million;	Nepal	US$1	million;	Afghanistan
US$1	million;	Sri	Lanka	US$5	million;	the	Maldives	US$200	thousand,	and	Bhutan	US$100	thousand),	compared	to
the	size	of	its	economy	and,	until	now,	the	low	mobilisation	of	its	large	pharmaceutical	industry	in	favor	of	the
regional	cause,	signals	of	its	limited	capacity	(if	it	is	not	intentionally)	to	exercise	regional	leadership.
Pakistan	has	declared	recently	a	contribution	of	US$3	million	to	the	COVID-19	Emergency	Fund.	However,
Pakistan	reinforces	that	all	member	contributions	should	be	attached	to	the	institutional	procedures	of	SAARC,
managed	by	the	Secretariat	of	the	Institution,	located	in	Kathmandu,	but	which	has	not	yet	established	the	general
regulations	for	the	use	of	the	fund.	India,	on	the	other	hand,	defends	the	use	of	the	resources	as	an	“autonomous
emergency	stage”,	remaining	outside	of	the	calendar	of	activities	approved	by	SAARC	(New	Delhi	fears	that
Pakistan	may	use	the	institutional	mechanism	to	constraint	initiatives	proposed	by	the	country),	which	created
divergences	between	these	two	countries	once	again.
On	the	other	hand,	however,	the	most	relevant	legacy	of	this	regional	reengagement,	concerns	the	power	of
political	articulation	at	the	institutional	level	to	deal	with	the	coronavirus	outbreak	and	its	human	and	economic
consequences.	In	this	sense,	SAARC	aims	to	centralise	the	acquisition	of	hospital	supplies,	medical	equipment	and
medicines	to	be	divided	between	Bhutan,	Nepal,	Afghanistan,	Maldives,	Bangladesh	and	Sri	Lanka.	On	March	26,	a
videoconference	meeting	was	held	between	high-level	health	authorities	regarding	specific	protocols	that	address
national	border	screenings	and	people	tracking,	online	training	for	emergency	response	teams,	measures	to	foster
technical	cooperation	through	a	shared	electronic	platform	and	a	permanent	exchange	of	information	between
health	professionals,	through	the	implementation	of	the	Information	Exchange	Platform	(IPE).	Actions	that	could	be
leveraged	from	the	regional	experience	of	Telemedicine	network	project	implemented	in	Afghanistan,	Nepal	and
Bhutan.
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Although,	at	first	glance,	the	amount	raised	by	SAARC	in	South	Asia	is	small	due	to	the	relatively	low	number	of
COVID-19	cases	in	the	region	(at	present),	it	is	one	of	the	most	populous	and	least	developed	regions	in	the	world,
presenting	greater	vulnerability	to	the	spread	of	the	coronavirus.		In	this	way,	India	seeks	to	make	regional
cooperation	in	SAARC	viable	through	the	creation	of	this	institutional	mechanism	that	is	associated	with	the
national	control	measures	of	the	member	states	and	which	may	deepen,	according	to	the	evolution	of	the	pandemic
in	the	region.	Joint	meetings	and	dialogue	between	SAARC	members	and	the	Shanghai	Cooperation	Organization
are	still	not	ruled	out.
In	this	regard,	India	also	plans	to	organise	meetings	with	SAARC	trade	and	industry	ministers	in	order	to	discuss
measures	to	minimise	the	economic	impact	of	the	coming	crisis.	New	Delhi	also	intends	to	review	trade
negotiations	with	SAARC,	as	many	countries	face	shortages	of	medical	supplies	and	difficulties	in	exporting
products	to	the	international	market,	due	to	the	blocking	measures	of	importing	countries.	However,	many	countries
produce	the	same	export	products,	being	international	competitors	instead	of	constituting	a	complementary	value
chain,	making	it	difficult	to	review	negotiations	or	stimulate	intra-SAARC	trade.
The	China	factor	is	another	obstacle	to	India’s	political	pretensions	in	the	region,	as	Beijing	is	an	important	trading
partner	for	South	Asian	countries	(contributing	to	economic	and	commercial	dynamism	in	the	region)	and	supplier	of
hospital	equipment,	it	might	lead	to	a	role	of	Indian	regional	leadership	in	the	shadow	of	the	presence	of	China.
Connectivity	problems	in	South	Asia	remain	a	major	obstacle	to	regional	trade	development,	keeping	the	SAARC
Preferred	Trade	Agreement	(SAPTA)	and	the	South	Asian	Free	Trade	Area	(SAFTA)	stagnant.
Looking	ahead
Although	It	would	be	misleading	to	presume	that	SAARC	would	be	resuming	its	active	phase,	as	India	has	been
working	on	strengthening	BIMSTEC	(Bay	of	Bengal	Initiative	for	Multi-Sectoral	Technical	and	Economic
Cooperation)	and	consolidating	the	concept	of	the	Indo-Pacific	throughout	its	extended	neighbouring	region,
regional	efforts	could	lead	SAARC	back	to	the	regional	game	again.	However,	many	challenges	will	come	and
regional	reengagement	will	not	take	place	in	a	short	time.	The	consequences	of	a	potential	worsening	of	COVID-19
seem,	however,	(although	with	great	difficulty)	to	possibly	help	Pakistan	and	India	appease	current	regional
tensions.	But	only	after	a	return	of	some	kind	of	normality,	we	will	be	able	to	see	if	the	pandemic	was	an	exogenous
factor	capable	of	overcoming	(for	an	instant)	historical	conflicts	that	mark	South	Asia’s	international	relations.
Therefore,	thinking	about	a	deep	reengagement	of	SAARC	is	still	far	from	reality.	Nonetheless,	regional
commitment	efforts	against	COVID-19	in	South	Asia	set	an	improving	example	of	a	regional	response	case,
initiatives	and	know-how,	which	could	lead	SAARC	to	an	institutional	renewal	in	the	next	years,	depends	on	how
India	and	Pakistan	are	able	to	keep	their	differences	apart	in	order	to	overcome	a	greater	issue.
Even	though	the	results	of	this	regional	behaviour	could	also	configure	a	new	regional	format,	based	on	SAARC	-1
(Pakistan)	or	even	SAARC	+1	(China),	considering	that	some	countries	are	involved	to	the	Belt	and	Road	Initiative
(BRI)	project.	No	doubt	world	politics	will	change	after	COVID-19,	but	only	after	the	epidemic	has	passed	will	we	be
able	to	check	whether	SAARC’s	attempt	to	demonstrate	to	the	world	that	a	regional	coordination	of	policies	in
response	to	coronavirus	outbreak	can	be	successful	in	South	Asia.
This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	and	not	the	position	of	the	South	Asia	@	LSE	blog,	nor	of	the	London
School	of	Economics.	Featured	photo:	Covid-19	test;	Credit:	Fernandozhiminaicela,	Pixabay.
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